The Insurgents

The aim of all this is to separate resisters from committed insurgents—to turn the current gold-yellow map back to the lighter hues of 2005. And then to go further. American planners estimate that 70-80% of their enemies should be persuadable, through kinder tactics, economic opportunities — and a formal reconciliation process. That too is on the agenda, though there is currently little agreement on how it might be done. Mr Karzai has often said he is willing to sit down with the Taliban’s supremo, Mullah Mohammad Omar. The UN and some European countries would perhaps support that. America, which for seven years has called the Taliban al-Qaeda’s cousins, may find this harder to condone. Yet it is worth noting that the Taliban’s one-eyed leader has not accepted Mr Karzai’s offer. They need to be both bolder and more careful. And why would he? Wherever he is, Mullah Omar must be smiling. America’s fresh effort is horribly belated and its commitment to Afghanistan is probably shakier than Mr Obama suggests. To maintain political support for his task, General McChrystal reckons he has a year to show serious progress—a blinkof- an-eye in counter-insurgency time. Nor are all his suggestions entirely new. Previous ISAF commanders, including General McKiernan, also issued promising directives, only to fail because of too
few resources and too little understanding in their forces, and too little support from the Afghan government. Rebooting Mr Karzai, assuming that he wins re-election and that it is possible, would be much better for his country than many more American brigades.